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ABSTRACT This case study looks at the avenues open for addressing serious 
allegations of murder, rape and assault brought by indigenous Guatemalans 
against a Canadian mining company, HudBay Minerals. While first-generation 
legal and development policy reforms have facilitated foreign mining in 
Guatemala, second-generation reforms have failed to address effectively conflicts 
arising from the development projects. The judicial mechanisms available in 
Guatemala are difficult to access and suffer from problems of corruption and 
intimidation. Relevant corporate social responsibility policies and mechanisms 
lack the necessary enforcement powers. Canadian courts have been reluctant to 
permit lawsuits against Canadian parent companies; however, in Choc v. HudBay 
and Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, Ontario judges have allowed cases to 
proceed on the merits of the case, providing an important, if limited, avenue 
toward corporate accountability. 
 
RÉSUMÉ Cette étude de cas examine les stratégies qui s’offrent pour traiter les 
allégations de meurtre, de viol et d’agression formulées par des autochtones 
guatémaltèques contre une compagnie minière canadienne, la HudBay Minerals. 
Alors que les réformes légales et institutionnelles de « première génération » ont 
facilité l’extraction minière par des compagnies étrangères, les réformes de « 
deuxième génération », qui s’intéressent aux droits sociaux et aux droits de la 
personne, n’offrent pas encore de mécanismes fiables pour résoudre les conflits 
résultant des actions des entreprises. En effet, les règles qui définissent la 
responsabilité sociale des entreprises et les jugements des mécanismes internationaux 
qui interviennent lors de plaintes ne sont pas contraignants pour les états. Or, il est 
très difficile d’accéder aux mécanismes judiciaires du Guatemala, sans compter 
qu’ils sont affligés par des problèmes de corruption et d’intimidation. En outre, les 
cours canadiennes ont jusqu’ici été réticentes à autoriser des actions légales 
contre les compagnies mères canadiennes. Cependant, dans Choc v. HudBay et 
Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, la Cour supérieure ontarienne a permis ces cas a 
procéder, s’il pourraient s’avérer une voie intéressante pour bien établir la 
responsabilité sociale des entreprises. 
Keywords: mining; Latin America; Chevron; HudBay; corporate social responsibility 
 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, we will examine the history of one particularly troubled nickel mine in 
Guatemala, located near the town of El Estor in the region of Izabal. The mine was 
born into violence, as indigenous people living on the site were removed to make room 
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 for the mine and the town in the 1960s and 1970s. Numerous murders, assaults, and 
other human rights violations have occurred as a result of the conflict between local 
indigenous people who have lived in the area since the late nineteenth century and the 
successive Canadian corporate entities INCO, Skye Resources, and HudBay Minerals, 
as well as their Guatemalan subsidiaries. 
We will study the practical dimensions of this case in the context of “second-
generation” reforms in the law and development field that have introduced social and 
human rights issues as a component of the rule of law. While first-generation reforms 
focused on judicial and institutional reforms to encourage an appropriate climate for 
commercial relations, second-generation reforms introduced a number of voluntary, soft 
law mechanisms to address social, environmental, and human rights aspects of 
development (Trubek 2006). However, they have been criticised for being more show 
than substance (Eslava 2008). Legal scholar Kerry Rittich suggests the need for specific 
case studies to determine how these social aspects are faring on the ground (Rittich 2006). 
We are not engaged in evaluating whether corporate social responsibility mechanisms or 
judicial reforms in Guatemala have improved the conduct of individual corporations, or 
judges, as the case may be; rather, we are making a more specific point, that the current 
mechanisms do not provide meaningful access to justice for those who are most in need 
of the protection of the law.
1 
Taking up Rittich’s suggestion, we describe a dispute, 
centred around allegations of murder and rape, between indigenous people in the El 
Estor region of Guatemala and the Canadian mining company HudBay Minerals. We 
first look at the history and context of the dispute, including a decades-long struggle over 
land and resources. We believe that an understanding of the history of the conflict 
reveals the contextual factors driving the actions of specific individuals. We take the 
approach that second-generation reforms must take into account history and context 
in a way that recognises the interests and rights of indigenous communities. 
We then review three avenues for addressing that dispute: seeking resolution in the 
 Guatemalan judicial system, relying on voluntary corporate social responsibility 
mechanisms, and suing in Canada. We argue that both the Guatemalan courts and 
corporate social responsibility mechanisms present serious limitations with respect to 
resolving claims of human rights abuses by Canadian mining companies. We are concerned 
that, while Canadian companies are permitted to profit from extractive activities in 
foreign jurisdictions, the Canadian court system has typically not stepped in to fill this 
gap with respect to the effects of those activities, finding either that the cases should be 
heard in foreign jurisdictions or that Canadian mining companies do not owe a duty of 
care to people in foreign countries directly affected by Canadian mining. 
Decisions rendered in 2013 by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and in 2014 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal may be an indication that Canadian courts are prepared 
to narrow this accountability gap. In the first decision, the judge ruled that three 
lawsuits filed by indigenous people of El Estor against HudBay may proceed to trial, 
as it is not “plain and obvious” that HudBay is not liable to the plaintiffs in negligence. 
In the second decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal provided that the Ontario courts had 
the jurisdiction to decide whether an Ecuadorian judgment could be enforced in Ontario. 
Regardless of whether these plaintiffs succeed in proving their case in either proceeding, 
the openness of the court to decide on the issues based on their merits provides an 
important precedent for those attempting to seek a remedy against Canadian mining 
corporations’ alleged wrongs committed abroad. 
We wish to point out two limitations to our methodology. First, we are only studying the 
interests of the individuals who are plaintiffs in the lawsuit. While there are different 
views about mining and the events in the region within the indigenous communities, we do 
not purport to generalise about interests in the indigenous community as a whole. We 
feel that this is a valid approach, as we are studying the availability of legal remedies to 
complainants, not the dynamics of community relations. Second, we are limited by the 
evidence that we have available, from court documents, newspaper reports and our own 
 personal knowledge of Guatemala. Consequently, while we present divergent versions 
of events, we do not attempt to draw conclusions about which version is correct or 
whether we have all the information; rather, we show that there are serious issues raised 
that need to be resolved in a process that can make determinations of fact and, if 
appropriate, provide redress. 
 
The establishment of INCO in Guatemala
2
 
The Canadian mining company INCO
3 first became involved in the Izabal region of 
Guatemala in 1960 through Exmibal, a subsidiary established with the US-based 
Hanna Mining Company (McFarlane 1989). The history of INCO in Guatemala shows 
that Canadian mining interests were promoted by the Canadian government, and yet 
that the Canadian government did not take the initiative to address corporate 
accountability for the violence associated with these mining operations. 
INCO planned to build an open pit nickel mine near the town of El Estor, located 
north of Lake Izabal in the area of Izabal in eastern Guatemala. However, there were 
two immediate obstacles to the realisation of INCO’s objective. First, open pit mining was 
prohibited under Guatemalan law. Second, in 1960, civil war began in Guatemala and the 
area around El Estor became the base of operations for guerrilla rebels (McFarlane 1989). 
INCO was able to surmount these difficulties through negotiations with Guatemala’s 
military government. INCO hired an engineer to rewrite the mining code, and this 
revised version was accepted by Guatemala’s Congress (McFarlane 1989). The 
resulting mining code of April 1965 specifically allowed for “open sky mining” 
(Driever 1985, 34). The company also received a 40-year lease to mine an area of 385 
km
2 
near El Estor as well as “generous tax concessions”. Finally, the military government 
provided INCO with the understanding that it would guarantee “stability” in the region 
(McFarlane 1989, 127). 
 Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio
4 
was responsible for clearing the indigenous people out 
of the INCO region in Zacapa-Lake Izabal in the late 1960s and 1970s (McFarlane 
1989; Bradbury 1985). The indigenous people of Izabal were largely Mayan Q’eqchi’, 
who had migrated to the area from the highlands of Verapaz in the late nineteenth 
century (Grandia 2006). During this “reign of terror”, the number of people killed is 
estimated to be between 3,000 and 6,000 (McFarlane 1989, 127). At the same time, Canada 
showed ongoing support for the El Estor project, as the Canadian ambassador to Guatemala, 
S. F. Rae, went on a well-publicised tour of the mine site in 1968 (McFarlane 1989). 
There was strong opposition to the Exmibal project from indigenous people and 
other concerned Guatemalans. A group of professors from the School of Economic 
Sciences at the University of San Carlos, Guatemala City, took up the cause and 
established a commission in 1969 (McFarlane 1989). The commission concluded that 
the Guatemalan government had not negotiated sufficient benefits from the project and 
that Exmibal would simply strip Guatemala of its riches (Driever 1985, 36). Public 
protests against the mine followed. Carlos Arana, who had become President of 
Guatemala, responded by suspending the constitutional right to assembly and arresting 
large numbers of people. The army occupied the university in an attempt to silence 
the opposition from the nation’s intellectual community. State death squads assassinated 
two law professors and members of the commission, Julio Camey Herrera and Adolfo 
Mijangos López. One other member of the commission was wounded in an 
assassination attempt and another was forced to flee the country due to death threats 
(Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer 1999; Bradbury 1985). The UN Commission on Historical 
Clarification (the Truth Commission) later found that these crimes were committed by 
state authorities in retaliation for opposition to the government’s policies (Guatemalan 
Commission for Historical Clarification 1999). 
In February 1971, an exploitation agreement was signed between INCO and the 
Guatemalan government. Major construction began on the El Estor mine in 1974 
 (Driever 1985), aided by a CAD20 million loan from the Canadian Export Development 
Corporation (Toronto Star, April 15, 1979). The UN Commission documented 
violence associated with the mine during this period. In 1978, two people in El Estor 
were shot and wounded by men riding in an Exmibal truck (Guatemalan Commission 
for Historical Clarification 1999, 679). The next month, employees of Exmibal were 
involved in the execution of four people in the municipality of Panzós, near El Estor 
(Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 105). In 1981, police officers 
riding in an Exmibal truck killed community leader Pablo Bac Caal (Guatemalan 
Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 674). 
In 1982, the market value of nickel was declining while the cost of oil was rising. As a 
result, INCO shut down the El Estor mine. While the mine lay dormant, violence in 
Guatemala continued. The most serious human rights violations were perpetrated under 
the dictator Rios Montt. There were 192 massacres in 1982 alone.
5 
Despite condemning 
these human rights violations in Guatemala in 1983, the Canadian government 
participated in negotiations to sell military planes to the Guatemalan air force. The 
Guatemalan military had been known to use their planes to shoot at indigenous 
villages (Lemco 1986). 
In 1996, the Guatemalan government signed a peace accord with the guerrillas, ending 
the 36year civil war. According to a 1998 report by Monsignor Juan Gerardi, which 
evaluated evidence and testimony of 600 people collected from across Guatemala over 
three years, 150,000 people were murdered, 50,000 disappeared and 1 million were 
displaced during the civil war (Gerardi 1998). In a 1999 report, Guatemala: Memories 
of Silence, the UN Commission found that the state, in some capacity, was responsible 
for 93 per cent of the human rights violations that occurred during the war and that 
the state had “committed acts of genocide against groups of the Maya people” (United 
Nations 2002, 2). 
 
 The Fenix project 
In 2004, a Canadian company called Skye Resources purchased the mine at El Estor. At 
that time, the mine came to be known as “Fenix” and was to be operated by Skye’s 
Guatemalan subsidiary, Compañia Guatemalteca de Níquel (CGN). As INCO’s 
original mining concession from the 1960s was set to expire, the Guatemalan 
government granted a licence for mining exploration at El Estor on 13 December 2004 
(International Labour Organization 2007, 40). According to a committee of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), despite the fact that indigenous people had 
not yet formalised their rights of ownership and possession with respect to the land in 
question, the Guatemalan government had an obligation under ILO Convention No. 
169 to consult with the affected indigenous people prior to granting the licence, which it 
had failed to do (International Labour Organization 2007, paragraphs 48–51). 
The Mayan Q’eqchi’ farmers in the Izabal region gradually began to occupy or reoccupy 
lands in El Estor that had been cleared of indigenous people for the mine in the 1960s and 
1970s. New settlements were formed on these lands, including the community of Barrio 
Revolución, and other communities, such as La Unión, were reoccupied (Paley 2007). 
Skye Resources referred to the reoccupation of the El Estor region as “land invasions” 
(Skye Resources 2007). Because of Skye Resources’ belief that it had the exclusive right 
to occupy the area, court orders were obtained to remove the “squatters”.6 On 8 and 9 
January 2007, hundreds of armed police officers and members of the military conducted 
forced evictions of five communities in the El Estor region, including Barrio Unión, La 
Pista, Barrio Revolución, Barrio La Paz and Lote Ocho (Paley 2007; Caal v. HudBay 
2011). During the evictions, people’s homes were destroyed and some were burned 
(Paley 2007). 
According to Skye Resources, “a peaceful atmosphere” was maintained during the 
evictions (Skye Resources 2007). President and CEO Ian Austin admitted that homes 
were burned, but claimed that the burning of homes was not caused by company people 
 (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2011). He stated that the company remained 
committed to “continue [its] discussions on matters of concern with the local communities 
in the El Estor region” (Skye Resources 2007). According to allegations in court 
documents, another set of evictions occurred on 17 January 2007. During these evictions, 
11 Mayan women of Lote Ocho were allegedly gang raped by police, military and 
Fenix security personnel. The women say that they were trapped by security personnel as 
they were attempting to leave their homes, and then raped by groups of men, including 
members of the Fenix security team, who were wearing uniforms bearing the initials 
CGN. Two of the women were pregnant at the time of the alleged rapes, and 
subsequently miscarried their unborn children (Caal v. HudBay 2011). CGN denies that 
these rapes occurred; according to the company, police reports show that no “illegal 
occupiers” were even present at the evictions on the date of the alleged rapes (HudBay 
Minerals, n.d.). 
The Fenix mine changed ownership again in 2008, when HudBay Minerals 
purchased Skye Resources, changing the name to HMI Nickel (HudBay Minerals 
2008a, 2008b). HudBay announced that it did not plan to begin construction at the 
Fenix site until market conditions became more favourable (HudBay Minerals 
2008b). During this time, some of the Mayan Q’eqchi’ people returned once again to 
the disputed land. 
In 2009, nickel was rising in price, and the company began considering spending the 
CAD1 billion necessary to open the mine (Grainger 2009).
7 
On 27 September 2009, there 
were protests against mining activities in several communities located near the Fenix 
mine, including the communities of La Unión and Las Nubes. In the violence that day 
seven people were shot, resulting in the death of community leader and school teacher 
Adolfo Ich Chamón, and serious injury to another community member, German Chub 
Choc. Five security guards were also injured. 
The events that led up to the violence are in dispute. According to one version of 
 events, the governor of Izabal, along with 50 CGN security guards, entered the 
community of Las Nubes to discuss resettlement of the community (Behrens 2009). These 
discussions lasted for a few hours, but did not lead to an agreement. In response to CGN’s 
presence, community members organised protests to assert their right to remain on the 
land. Adolfo Ich’s family claims that protests were sparked by the “intrusion of Fenix 
security personnel into Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities” and “fears of renewed forced and 
violent evictions” (Choc v. HudBay 2010, paragraph 51). Residents of La Unión joined 
those of Las Nubes in a march toward the town of El Estor to denounce “illegal 
evictions” and to gather support for their cause (Rodriguez 2009). At around three in 
the afternoon, security guards reportedly opened fire on community members, wounding 
eight people (Behrens 2009). According to the Ich family’s statement of claim, Adolfo 
Ich was in his home in La Unión when he heard gunshots being fired. He left his 
home to see what was going on and if he could help restore the calm (Choc v. HudBay 
2010). As he was a respected community leader, he was apparently recognised by 
security personnel. The claim states that he was unarmed when he was surrounded by 
a dozen armed CGN security guards who beat him, dragged him away and severed 
his arm with a machete. The head of CGN security, Mynor Padilla, is alleged to 
have shot him in the head. Padilla is a former high-ranking officer in the Guatemalan 
military. 
An alternative version of events is provided by HudBay. According to the company, 
authorities were attempting to “peacefully resolv[e] illegal occupations through 
dialogue” when “organised protestors” attacked departing government vehicles 
(HudBay Minerals 2009). HudBay claims that the protestors stole automatic firearms 
and other weapons from the police station and attacked a community hospital that had 
been sponsored by CGN. HudBay acknowledges that a protestor died that day; however, 
it claims that “CGN personnel were not involved with his death” (HudBay Minerals, 
n.d.). HudBay suggested that Adolfo Ich died as a result of a “confrontation among the 
 protestors” (HudBay Minerals 2009). The company expressed its commitment to 
working with residents to arrive at a “fair and equitable solution to the land claims and 
resettlement”. Regardless of which version of events is believed, the incident highlights 
the ongoing tensions occurring in the area as a result of unsettled land claims. 
 
The three cases from El Estor 
Members of the Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities around the Fenix mine are bringing three 
related lawsuits in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against the Canadian mining 
company HudBay Minerals. The first lawsuit was commenced on 24 September 2010 by 
the widow of Adolfo Ich Chamán, who was killed during the protests around El Estor in 
September 2009. As discussed above, the claim alleges that Adolfo Ich was “hacked 
and shot to death by private security forces employed by [CGN] near his home in El 
Estor, Guatemala” (Choc v. HudBay 2010, paragraph 1). 
The claim made by Adolfo Ich’s widow is that HudBay, both in Canada and 
Guatemala, was negligent in deploying security forces into the community of La Unión 
and in authorising the use of excessive force in response to the peaceful opposition, despite 
the corporation’s knowledge that the security personnel were unlicensed, using illegal 
weapons and had in the past used unreasonable violence against local Mayan populations. 
Furthermore, the allegation is that HudBay continued to employ under-trained and 
inadequately supervised security personnel and, regardless of public commitments to the 
contrary, failed to implement or enforce adequate standards of conduct and oversight, 
which would have prevented the murder of Adolfo Ich. 
On the same day that Adolfo Ich was shot, German Chub was shot, allegedly by the 
same mine company security personnel (Chub v. HudBay 2011). The then 21-year-old 
single father has been left a paraplegic by the shooting and has lost the use of his 
right lung. He had not been involved in any protests on that day but was watching a 
football game at a community football field and was shot without provocation. On 26 
 October 2011, Chub commenced a lawsuit against HudBay Minerals and CGN, 
similarly alleging that the violence against him was caused by negligent 
authorisation of the deployment of heavily armed security personnel into Mayan 
Q’eqchi’ communities on 27 September 2009. 
The final lawsuit against the corporation relates to the forcible evictions of the 
community of Lote Ocho that took place in January 2007, as discussed above. Eleven 
women – Luisa Caal Chun, Margarita Caal Caal, Rosa Elbira Coc Ich, Olivia Asig 
Xol, Amalia Cac Tiul, Lucia Caal Chun, Carmelina Caal Ical, Irma Yolanda Choc Cac, 
Elvira Choc Chub, Elena Choc Quib and Irma Yolanda Choc Quib – have 
commenced an action against HudBay Minerals and HMI Nickel for the alleged 
gang rapes by uniformed mining company security personnel, police, and military 
during the forceful expulsion of Mayan Q’eqchi’ families (Caal v. HudBay 2011). 
The claim alleges that the security forces who committed the rapes were under the 
control and direction of Canadian mining company Skye Resources, which sought the 
forced eviction in order to clear the land of the indigenous communities for its Fenix mining 
project. The claim asserts that HudBay’s 2008 purchase of and merger with Skye 
Resources (renamed HMI Nickel) makes HudBay responsible for the past legal 
wrongs and liabilities of Skye Resources. The lawsuit alleges that the harm suffered by 
the plaintiffs was caused by the negligence of Skye Resources in failing to direct and 
supervise its security personnel, knowing that they lacked the licence required under 
Guatemalan law, and authorising the forced evictions without taking reasonable steps to 
control violence against the community, although it made public representations to the 
contrary. 
In September 2011, HudBay sold the Fenix mine and all of its Guatemalan assets to 
Solway Investment Group, a private company with a head office in Cyprus (HudBay 
Minerals 2011). While HudBay had purchased the mine for CAD446 million, it was sold 
for only CAD76 million (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2011). The lawsuits against 
 HudBay are proceeding despite the sale (Klippensteins, n.d.). 
On 22 July 2013, Justice Carole J. Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
rejected three preliminary motions filed by HudBay and allowed the three cases to 
proceed to trial. We will come back to the discussion of this case below, in the section 
“The courts in Canada”. 
 
The context for judicial decision making in Guatemala 
The plaintiffs in the three El Estor cases have decided to pursue their claims against 
HudBay in Canadian courts rather than in Guatemala. There is good reason for Canadian 
courts to hear cases like these on their merits, given the context for judicial decision 
making in Guatemala. This section will outline the state of impunity in Guatemala, as 
expressed by international bodies, and will then provide an example of a case that 
made its way through the Guatemalan courts, to illustrate the difficulties faced by 
plaintiffs who wish to receive a fair trial in a claim against the interests of foreign mining 
companies. 
According to a 2009 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of 
judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, the Guatemalan justice system is afflicted by a 
general climate of impunity for violent crimes and human rights abuses: 
 
the prevalence of impunity in Guatemala has a number of causes, the main ones being a 
variety of structural factors and the violence to which justice professionals are subjected [ 
… ]. The existing system is open to external interference and is highly politicised, and this 
has a negative impact on the independence of the judiciary. (United Nations 2009a, 1) 
 
Similarly, the 2012 Human Rights Report on Guatemala prepared by the US Department of 
State asserts that the Guatemalan judicial system has failed to “ensure full and timely 
 investigations and fair trials” and to “protect judicial sector officials, witnesses, and civil 
society representatives from intimidation” (US Department of State 2012, 1). It notes that 
judges, prosecutors, plaintiffs and witnesses “continued to report threats, intimidation, 
and surveillance” (US Department of State 2012, 7). 
This situation has improved to some degree since the establishment of the UN-backed 
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG); however, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions cautions that 
“neither Guatemala nor the international community should fall into the trap of seeing 
CICIG as ‘the’ solution to Guatemala’s failing criminal justice system” (United Nations 
2009b, 12) and the US Department of State report observes that “impunity continue[d] to 
be widespread” despite the efforts of the CICIG (US Department of State 2012, 1).8 
As an illustration, we describe a case from Guatemala’s Constitutional Court in which 
the claimants were required to pursue an excessive number of judicial proceedings in 
order to obtain a remedy for a relatively simple problem involving formal title to 
communal property. The community of Agua Caliente Lote Nueve located near the Fenix 
project in El Estor complained that CGN was illegally exploring on its land and said that 
mining personnel moved boundary stones and made exploration holes, which affected 
the community’s water (Constitutional Court 2011).9 The community asked 
Fontierras
10 
to confirm that the community of Lote Nueve had title to its land. There 
was a problem with this request, and the resolution to this problem reveals much 
about the judicial system and its potential influences. 
Under a land reform statute, communities were able to purchase land to hold under 
communal title. The community in this case began paying for the land in 1985 and was 
awarded provisional title, conditional on completing the scheduled payments. They made 
the final payment on 18 July 2002. In 2004 the mine was being transferred from INCO 
to Skye Resources. On 2 July 2004, Fontierras informed the community that the 
registry book had been damaged in 1998 and that the pages of the registry that 
 contained their title were missing. Fontierras told the community that they would have 
to go to court to obtain an order to replace the pages. 
The same year, the community went to the Ninth Judge of the Civil Trial Court.
11 
Their 
case was rejected because the judge held that the community had begun the wrong 
process for the remedy that they were seeking. The community then went to the Tenth 
Judge of the Civil Trial Court, but were rejected because the document certifying the 
legal status of the representative was illegible. The community returned to the Tenth 
Judge, who then found that there was no certification that the land claimed was the land that 
was referred to in the missing pages. In 2007, the community again appealed to Fontierras 
for assistance. They were rebuffed a second time, and told that they needed to obtain a 
judicial order. When the community returned to court, this time the Sixth Judge of the 
Civil Trial Court, their case was dismissed because the community had failed to provide 
proof that the missing pages referred to the land that they were claiming. The community 
returned to Fontierras to ask them to replace the pages, and they were told a third time 
that a court order was necessary. Finally, the community began a constitutional 
proceeding, arguing that their constitutional rights had been violated through the refusal of 
Fontierras to confirm their title. 
The constitutional application was heard at the first level by the Court of Appeals on 
15 February 2010. This was a year after HudBay started considering reactivating the mine 
and had been trying remove indigenous occupants from lands needed for the mine. The 
judge found that the community already had title confirmed on 17 February 2004 and 
that Fontierras had replaced the missing pages, pursuant to an order from the Fifth Judge 
of the Civil Trial Court on 20 December 2004. Consequently, there was no basis for the 
proceeding. The judge ordered costs against the community and fined the lawyer 1,000 
quetzales (approximately CAD143) for bringing the proceeding. The history of Lote 
Nueve, as recounted by the judge of the Court of Appeals, is completely different from the 
story we have recounted above, in which Lote Nueve did not have the missing pages 
 replaced and were being shunted back and forth between the courts and Fontierras. This is 
because the judge of the Court of Appeals based his decision on the documents from 
another community, Agua Caliente Sexan Lote Once. 
The community of Lote Nueve appealed this decision, and was able to present its case 
to the Constitutional Court in 2010. Lawyers for Fontierras and for CGN intervened to 
ask the Constitutional Court to uphold a decision that was clearly based on mistaken 
documents. Fortunately for the community, the Constitutional Court found in their 
favour, and confirmed that the Court of Appeals had relied on mistaken documents. The 
Constitutional Court reviewed documents that confirmed that the provisional title had 
been awarded in 1985 and documents that confirmed that the final payment had been 
made in 2002. The judges of the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that the 
only step remaining was the administrative act of confirming title. The Court then 
ordered that the missing pages be replaced, confirming community title to the land. It 
was unnecessary, then, for land title to be thrown into limbo for seven years when the 
evidence that fulfilled the conditions for title was readily available. It is interesting that 
the missing pages were noticed at around the same time as exploration was taking place 
on the land in question and as the mine was being sold by INCO to Skye Resources. 
Without more facts, we do not know whether CGN played an active role in the 
circumstances surrounding Lote Nueve’s title, but we do know that HudBay had an interest 
in the outcome of the hearing at the Constitutional Court, as lawyers for CGN intervened 
and argued that the community of Lote Nueve should not have their title confirmed. As 
of May 2013, two years after the Constitutional Court decision, the 
missing pages in the registry have not been replaced. 
 
We do not argue that it is impossible to obtain a fair trial for a claim against the 
interests of a mining company within the Guatemalan justice system. Nevertheless, 
the barriers faced by plaintiffs who wish to sue mining companies in Guatemala are 
 significant, and they are compounded by the difficulty in retaining a lawyer for cases 
such as these. The Lote Nueve case, for example, was supported by Leo Crippa, a 
lawyer for the Washington-based Indian Law Resource Centre. 
A further problem exists in respect to the availability of remedies. A decision of a 
court in Guatemala against CGN alone will not reach the conduct of executives in 
Canada, or the assets of the Canadian parent. Even if a Guatemalan court were to 
make an order against the parent company, HudBay Minerals, enforcement would 
have to be transferred to a court in Canada, where further litigation could take place, 
challenging the original decision in Guatemala. This would further lengthen an 
already arduous process and render it prohibitively expensive. 
 
Corporate social responsibility 
If claimants such as those from El Estor are unable to obtain a fair trial in the Guatemalan 
courts, it might be suggested that corporate social responsibility (CSR) mechanisms 
adopted by mining companies can provide appropriate redress. We argue in this section 
that the voluntary nature of CSR and the lack of enforcement mechanisms make it an 
inadequate forum for resolving cases in which there are allegations of serious human 
rights abuses and significant factual discrepancies between the positions of the claimants 
and those of the company. 
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in, and adoption of, CSR polices 
by the mining industry (Dashwood 2012; Sagebien and Lindsay 2011). The establishment 
of the United Nations’ “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” framework 
(“Ruggie Principles”) has provided further impetus to develop standards of behaviour that 
address a company’s impact on the environment and local communities (United Nations 
2011). 
HudBay heavily promotes its commitment to CSR. Its website shows that it has 
internal policies on human rights, the environment, and business ethics. It has also adopted 
 a number of external instruments, including the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights (Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, n.d.), the Global 
Reporting Initiative (Global Reporting Initiative, n.d.), and the “Toward Sustainable 
Mining” framework of the Mining Association of Canada (Mining Association of 
Canada 2011). Each year, HudBay publishes an attractive 50page Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report, setting out its accomplishments (HudBay Minerals 2012). 
We do not propose to describe and analyse each of these CSR policies, nor do we 
wish to suggest that HudBay is being disingenuous in adopting these standards. 
Rather, we wish to show that the policies will not serve as an adequate mechanism for 
addressing the issues raised by the Guatemalan plaintiffs. 
The 2012 Corporate Social Responsibility Report lists four “avenues available to 
people who wish to register concern about HudBay’s activities” (HudBay Minerals 2012, 
13). The first two avenues provide phone numbers and a website to the Board or a 
Committee of the Board to register a concern. In the case of the Guatemalan plaintiffs, this 
avenue would not have been fruitful for serious criminal charges, as HudBay released a 
press release saying that its own investigations had shown that “a protestor died” but that 
company personnel were not involved; and that rapes did not take place (HudBay 
Minerals, n.d.). HudBay maintains this position despite the arrest of their head of security, 
Mynor Padilla, in 2012 for the murder of Adolfo Ich Chamán (Prensa Libre 2012). Given 
that HudBay had already publicly declared its own findings of fact, the plaintiffs would 
not expect to have a fair hearing from HudBay. 
The third avenue of redress suggested by HudBay is the federal government’s 
Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor. In 2009, Canada’s federal government 
released a policy called “Building the Canadian Advantage: A CSR Strategy for the 
International Extractive Sector”, which established the Office of the Extractive Sector 
Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor. The CSR Counsellor does not have any 
significant powers. She can only act when there has been a complaint; a process can be 
 instituted only with the agreement of the corporation; she cannot offer determinations as to 
whether harm has occurred; she cannot investigate the complaints; and she cannot issue 
binding recommendations to the corporations (Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). 
The limitations of the process are clearly illustrated in a complaint about labour practices 
that was lodged against a Canadian mining company, Excellon Resources Inc., in 
Mexico. The CSR Counsellor found that the Mexican workers were “eager to engage 
in a good faith dialogue”, but Excellon unilaterally withdrew from the process after 
six months. This brought the process to an abrupt end (CSR Counsellor 2011). In 
fact, in all three of the cases in which the CSR Counsellor was ready to begin 
mediation, the process ended when the mining company decided to withdraw from the 
process. For the Guatemalan plaintiffs, the most that the CSR Counsellor could do 
would be to try to convene a meeting, but she would be powerless to require HudBay 
to participate. Even if HudBay agreed to participate, she would not be able to 
investigate what happened or provide compensation if there was wrongdoing. 
The final mechanism suggested by HudBay is the National Contact Point of the 
Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). The OECD has 
developed Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which state that corporations should 
“respect the internationally recognised human rights of those affected by their activities” 
(OECD 2011, 19). In order to implement the Guidelines, the OECD Council created a 
system of National Contact Points (NCPs) in 2000; these are typically government 
officials in each of the member states. The role of the NCP is to facilitate inquiries and 
discussions between corporations and affected communities on all matters covered by the 
Guidelines. The NCP has some capacity to investigate complaints directly by seeking 
information from parties to the dispute and can attempt to mediate between the parties 
to come to a resolution. Neither the resolution nor the statement is binding on the 
corporation or enforceable by state governments. The NCP does have fact-finding 
powers, but these are not commonly used. The NCP does not have the power to award 
 compensation. If there is no resolution, the NCP can review the evidence, consult experts, 
make a determination and issue a statement on the case (OECD 2011). 
None of these mechanisms suggested by HudBay provide an effective method for 
investigating whether the allegations are true, for ascertaining responsibility, or for 
awarding penalties or redress. For this reason, we turn in the next section to the 
Canadian courts as the remaining potential avenue to fairly resolve the dispute between 
the plaintiffs from El Estor and HudBay. 
 
The courts in Canada 
Having a case decided in a Canadian court has the advantage of producing an 
enforceable decision. A judgment against the parent company, HudBay, could result in 
payments to the plaintiffs and could shed light on the conduct of the executives. 
Judges in Canada have had several opportunities to address concerns about the 
activities of mining companies with operations abroad. They have articulated three 
principles that create barriers to bringing a case in Canada: lack of jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens and lack of duty of care.
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We will discuss each of these principles in the context of a case against a transnational 
mining company and then explain how these principles play out in the lawsuits from El 
Estor. 
 
Jurisdiction 
On 8 November 2010, the Canadian Association Against Impunity brought a class action 
against Anvil Mining Ltd. in Quebec for the corporation’s actions relating to a massacre 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Mining Watch 2010). Anvil Mining 
was headquartered in Perth, Australia, but opened a small office in Montreal in 2005. 
Its primary activity was the exploration of a mine located 55 kilometres from Kilwa in 
the DRC (Association Canadienne Contre L’impunité (ACCI) c Anvil Mining Ltd. 2011). 
 On 13 October 2004, a small group of approximately 10 armed individuals from 
neighbouring Zambia, claiming to act on behalf of the Revolutionary Movement for the 
Liberation of Katanga, entered Kilwa. The government of the DRC ordered army 
officers to remove the men and to regain control of Kilwa. A UN mission in the 
DRC subsequently documented the army’s human rights violations against the people 
of Kilwa perpetrated during the counterattack (Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo 2005). According to the mission’s report, 73 civilians were killed and a large 
percentage of the population was displaced as they fled the counterattack. Twenty-eight 
people were reported to have been summarily executed based on suspicions that they 
supported the insurgents. 
The mission’s report stated that Anvil provided support to the military during the 
events by providing its planes to transport troops to Kilwa and providing trucks, 
drivers, fuel and food rations to the army. It also stated that the managing director of 
Anvil Mining admitted in an interview with an Australian television station that the 
corporation provided logistics to the army. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the action on the basis that the Court had no 
jurisdiction. It found that at the time of the massacre there was no Anvil activity or office 
in Quebec and that, in any event, the dispute was not substantially connected to Anvil’s 
work in Quebec. The Court did not apply the forum of necessity exception, which permits 
the Court to assume jurisdiction where there is a sufficient connection to the jurisdiction 
and proceedings could not possibly or reasonably be instituted outside Quebec (Civil Code 
of Quebec, article 3136). The Court found that the claim against Anvil could be heard in 
Australia, the corporate headquarters, and that victims could bring their case before the 
courts in the DRC, although attempts to try the cases in those jurisdictions before had 
been unsuccessful. 
Anvil’s overall revenue for the DRC rose from USD29 million in 2004 to almost 
USD69 million in 2005 (Anvil 2005). 
 Although in ACCI c. Anvil Mining Ltd the courts declined to exercise jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a tort that had been committed outside of Canada, in Yaiguaje v. Chevron 
Corporation Ontario courts considered the related issue of whether they should exercise 
jurisdiction to enforce a judgment that had been obtained outside Canada (Yaiguaje v. 
Chevron Corporation 2013). 
The underlying dispute was between 47 plaintiffs – representing approximately 
30,000 residents of Sucumbíos province in Ecuador – and Chevron, an American 
corporation incorporated in Delaware. The plaintiffs alleged that Texaco, which 
subsequently merged with Chevron, severely polluted the Lago Agrio region of Ecuador 
during its activities between 1972 and 1990. The plaintiffs brought an action before the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1993, which was 
eventually dismissed. As a condition of dismissal, Texaco committed to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian court when a claim was brought in that jurisdiction. 
On 11 February 2011, the trial court in Ecuador found that Chevron was liable for 
approximately USD18 billion. In 2013, the highest appellate court in Ecuador, the Court 
of Cassation, reduced the damages on appeal to USD9.51 billion. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs have not been able enforce the judgment. Chevron 
continues to contend that the trial judgment was obtained by fraud and corruption by the 
plaintiffs’ counsel. In 2011, a New York District Court granted Chevron a global anti-
enforcement injunction, barring the enforcement of the judgment. This injunction was 
overturned on appeal (Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation 2013, C.A., paragraphs 5–13). 
In 2012, the plaintiffs brought an action in Ontario, seeking recognition and 
enforcement of the judgment against the assets of Chevron and its Canadian subsidiary, 
Chevron Canada Limited (Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation 2013, Ont. Sup. Ct., 
paragraph 3). The defendants, Chevron and Chevron Canada, did not file statements of 
defence but instead challenged the jurisdiction of the court to enforce the judgment. In 
other words, Chevron argued that the Ecuadorians should be barred from the Ontario 
 justice system. The Ontario Court of Appeal was clearly irritated by the position taken by 
Chevron. Mr Justice MacPherson pointed out the shifting positions taken by Chevron in 
various court proceedings: 
 
For 20 years, Chevron has contested the legal proceedings of every court involved in this 
litigation – in the United States, Ecuador and Canada [ … ]. In these circumstances, the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs should have an opportunity to attempt to enforce the Ecuadorian 
judgment in a court where Chevron will have to respond on the merits. (Yaiguaje v. Chevron 
Corporation 2013, C.A., paragraphs 69 and 70) 
 
The Court of Appeal found that Ontario courts could hear the case and hear arguments 
from both sides about whether or not the Ecuadorian judgment could be enforced in 
Canada. 
Chevron has since sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (Supreme 
Court of Canada 2014) and has continued fighting the case in the USA. In March 2014, a 
US District Court Judge found that the plaintiffs’ counsel had engaged in fraud and 
corruption in order to obtain the Ecuadorian judgment. Although the US decision does not 
bar the enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment in Canada, or in Brazil and Argentina 
(where the plaintiffs have also sought enforcement), it may cause the Ontario courts 
“to take a second look at the enforceability of the Ecuador judgment” if there was 
fraud (Krauss 2014). However, the finding of fraud could only be made if Chevron 
agrees to bring itself under the jurisdiction of the Ontario court to argue on the merits 
that the judgment should not be enforced against it. Thus Chevron appears to be in a 
difficult position. If it continues to argue that Ontario courts do not have jurisdiction 
to hear the case by the Ecuadorians, then it will not be able to argue in a Canadian court 
that the Ecuadorian judgment was fraudulent. If Chevron wishes to argue that the 
Ecuadorian judgment was fraudulent in a Canadian court, it will have to agree that the 
 Ecuadorians also have the right to have their case heard in Canada. 
 
Forum non conveniens 
As noted above, even when a court accepts jurisdiction, the defendant company can 
assert that there is a more appropriate forum for the claim can be heard. In 1998, a 
class action was brought in Quebec against Canadian mining corporation Cambior 
Inc. by a group of 23,000 victims represented by a public interest group, Recherches 
Internationales Québec. The claim alleged that a failed tailings dam leaked 2.3 
billion litres of liquid containing cyanide and heavy metals into the Esequibo River 
in Guyana on 19 August 1995. Justice Maughan, who was hearing the case, described 
the leak as one of the worst environmental disasters in gold mining history 
(Recherches Internationales Québec v. Cambior Inc 1998). 
The action was dismissed without being heard on the merits. The Quebec Superior 
Court ruled that it had jurisdiction but applied the legal doctrine of forum non conveniens 
codified in Quebec’s civil code. The Court based its decision on the fact that Guyana was 
the location of the spill, the location of many of the witnesses and victims, the location in 
which the damage was suffered and that Guyanese law would apply to the incident. 
Furthermore, the Court noted that its decision not to hear the case did not deny the victims 
justice, since “Guyana’s judicial system would provide the victims with a fair and 
impartial hearing”. It rejected the claim that “the administration of justice is in such a 
state of disarray that it would constitute an injustice to the victims to have their case 
litigated in Guyana” (Recherches Internationales Québec v. Cambior Inc. 1998, 
paragraph 12). The victims did pursue their claim in Guyana’s courts, but due to failure to 
file an affidavit, in 2006 the action was struck by the High Court of the Supreme Court 
of Judicature of Guyana and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the company’s legal 
costs (CNN Money 2006). Cambior continued to operate profitably until 2005, when 
 the mine was exhausted (Ramraj, n.d.; Cambior 2004). 
 
Duty of care 
A component of establishing that a mining company is responsible for human rights abuses 
is the existence of a legal obligation to take reasonable care in the conduct of mining 
operations that could foreseeably harm the interests of the claimants. In Canada and in 
many other common law jurisdictions, duty of care is established when the court 
determines that: the harm suffered is “reasonably foreseeable” as a result of the 
defendant’s conduct; and there is a relationship of “proximity” between the defendant 
and the claimant, such that the defendant should be required to contemplate the 
claimant’s legitimate interests when acting (Donoghue v. Stevenson 1932). 
In the context of transnational corporations, there are several obstacles to finding 
such a relationship. Owing to legal requirements of the country in which the mining is 
taking place or in order to avoid financial liability, a subsidiary of the parent corporation 
is often incorporated in the country of operations to conduct the extraction or 
production of the mineral resource. The subsidiary is in charge of day-to-day operations 
on the ground, which often include hiring and training employees, conducting 
exploration and maintaining the mine. Where third parties, such as private security 
companies hired by subsidiary corporations, commit violence, it may be difficult to 
impute their wrongdoing to the parent corporation. The difficulty in establishing duty of 
care was evidenced by the suit commenced in 2008 against two of the directors of 
Copper Mesa, a Canadian mining company in Ecuador, as well as the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX). The claimants, Ecuadorian campesinos from areas adjacent to 
Junin, where Copper Mesa attempted to carry out exploration activities, opposed the 
proposed mine (Klippensteins 2009, paragraphs 13–15). Prior to Copper Mesa being 
listed on the TSX, the mayor of the county informed the TSX of the opposition to 
the mine in the community and the likelihood of violence. 
 On 2 December 2006, a large group of armed security forces confronted members of the 
Junin community and sprayed pepper spray directly into the eyes of one of the claimants. 
The security forces then shot into the crowd, injuring another of the claimants. A 
representative of the community met with the Copper Mesa directors on 27 April 2007 to 
advise them of the confrontation and risk of violence. However, the violence continued. 
One of the plaintiffs was alleged to have received death threats in June 2007 and one 
month later was allegedly attacked by a mob led by affiliates of the corporation, who 
assaulted him with sticks and rocks before the police intervened (Klippensteins 2009).
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The Ontario Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence to hold the Copper Mesa 
directors personally liable, upholding the determination of the lower court that the 
directors did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs as there was no direct connection 
between acts or omissions of the directors and the harm caused to the plaintiffs. The 
Court held that the circumstances in which directors could be held personally liable for 
negligence for the acts of the corporation were limited and were not met in this case. 
The Court found that the defendants had only recently become directors when the 
representative of the community advised them of the potential violence, and it was not 
claimed that the directors directly operated the Copper Mesa entities or authorised the 
violence, nor was it specified how the policies and practices of the corporation led to 
violence. The Court was not sympathetic to the argument that the directors had been 
informed and that silence from the directors in the face of the violence amounted to tacit 
approval of the violence against the plaintiffs (Piedra v. Copper Mesa Mining 
Corporation 2011). 
In the HudBay case, the company did not contest the fact that Ontario courts had 
jurisdiction to hear the case. However, HudBay initially argued that the case should be 
heard in Guatemala based on forum non conveniens. They abruptly dropped this ground 
of objection shortly before a hearing on the matter (Klippensteins, n.d.). In the end, 
HudBay relied on the third ground: the lack of duty of care. In other words, even if the 
 allegations of murder and rape by their security forces were true, HudBay would not be 
responsible because the parent did not have a duty of care to community members in 
Guatemala. Therefore, HudBay argued, there would be no purpose in having a trial. 
The Ontario Superior Court rejected this argument, finding that it was not “plain and 
obvious” that the actions would not succeed. In doing so, the Court has acknowledged 
that parent companies may owe a duty of care to individuals in foreign countries to prevent 
harm caused by “security personnel at its foreign operations when there is direct 
control by the Canadian parent corporation” (Choc v. HudBay 2013, paragraph 73). 
The Court found that the plaintiffs have alleged facts which, if proven at trial, could 
establish the elements of foreseeability and proximity necessary to establish a duty of care. 
The Court stated that acts such as “requesting a forced eviction of a community using 
hundreds of security personnel” and “authorising the use of force in response to peaceful 
opposition from the local community” would make it reasonably foreseeable to 
HudBay/Skye that violence would result, including “raping the plaintiffs” and “killing 
Adolfo Ich and seriously injuring German Chub” (Choc v. HudBay 2013, paragraphs 63–
64). The Court found that HudBay’s public commitment to maintaining a relationship with 
local communities is a factor in finding that a relationship of proximity may be 
established at trial. 
Because this decision is the result of a preliminary proceeding only, the existence of a 
duty of care will have to be established at trial. However, it is important to note that 
HudBay has decided not to appeal this preliminary decision and the case will proceed to 
be tried on its merits. 
 
Access to justice 
A resolution of conflict between mining corporations and communities does not 
automatically require a judicial determination in the Canadian courts. In fact, some 
aspects of the El Estor cases make judicial resolution impractical. For example, threats of 
 violence to potential plaintiffs and witnesses can prevent evidence from being brought 
forward, regardless of whether a case is heard in Canada or in the jurisdiction in which the 
alleged incidents occurred. There is also a significant difficulty when the plaintiffs have 
limited access to funds to retain counsel. Additionally, the present cases against HudBay 
will not resolve underlying political issues such as the decadeslong dispute over land 
rights. Nevertheless, due to significant shortcomings of other dispute resolution 
mechanisms, a Canadian judicial determination on the merits may be the only practical 
way, at the present time, to resolve issues raised in the El Estor cases. The court system in 
Guatemala would likely not be reliable, as the judicial system in Guatemala appears “open 
to external interference and is highly politicised” (United Nations 2009a, 2), and the 
outcome of a judicial process could be influenced by mining interests. The Lote Nueve 
case, plagued by troubling administrative delays, indicates the significant barriers faced 
by mine-affected plaintiffs. In any event, a decision against a Guatemalan subsidiary 
may not effect the necessary change in the parent company’s practices, or be sufficient 
to impose the rule of law on Canadian executives. 
CSR mechanisms are not adequate for resolving serious allegations of human rights 
abuses against Canadian mining companies. Mechanisms coordinated by the mining 
company are ineffective when the company disputes the basic facts alleged by the 
complainants. Mechanisms coordinated by a third party, such as the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Counsellor or the National Contact Points of the OECD, are voluntary and 
not enforceable. Given the limitations of alternative mechanisms for resolving these 
disputes, there is a lack of adequate accountability measures with respect to Canadian 
mining companies with operations in other jurisdictions. We find it contradictory that 
profits can travel freely from Guatemala to Canada, while the Canadian beneficiaries are 
not held responsible for how that money is raised or for activities undertaken to produce 
the profits. Canadian courts do have the ability to fill the void. As demonstrated by the 
cases of Anvil Mining, Cambior, and Copper Mesa, legal obstacles such as jurisdiction, 
 forum non conveniens and duty of care can prevent cases like these from being 
tried on their merits in Canada. However, Choc v. HudBay may represent an important 
change in course, at least with respect to duty of care. 
As discussed above, the Ontario Superior Court has now acknowledged that parent 
companies may owe a duty of care to individuals in foreign countries to prevent harm 
caused by “security personnel at its foreign operations when there is direct control by 
the Canadian parent corporation” (Choc v. HudBay 2013, paragraph 73). If the trial court 
confirms this finding, individuals alleging injury caused by Canadian mining operations 
will have access to an enforceable mechanism of accountability. While the legal barriers 
mentioned above and other barriers such as the cost of litigation and availability of 
evidence will still exist, we may be at the beginning of a shift in judicial thinking on the 
relationship between Canadian transnational corporations and the individuals at the 
location of operations. Until such time as Guatemala’s judiciary is strengthened and is able 
to act, the Canadian courts may be the most viable forum.
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In a globalised world, encouraging ethical behaviour cannot be left to a single 
jurisdiction or a single institution. We hope that the time has come for Canadian courts to 
begin to participate in creating the mechanisms necessary to close the gap in corporate 
accountability. 
A spokesperson for Chevron, referring to the Ecuadorian case, stated that “We’re 
going to fight this until hell freezes over. And then we’ll fight it out on the ice”, to 
which the Ontario Court of Appeal replied: 
 
Chevron’s wish is granted. After all these years, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs deserve to have the 
recognition and enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment heard on the merits in an appropriate 
jurisdiction. At this juncture, Ontario is that jurisdiction. (Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation 
2013, C.A., paragraphs 74 and 75) 
 
 In the words of retired Supreme Court of Canada judge Ian Binnie, “[a]pplying our law 
to situations outside of our territory is contrary to our custom; but there are acts that are so 
repugnant that they must force us to rethink our law” (Boisvert 2012).15 
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Notes 
1. See also North and Young (2013) and Keenan (2013). 
2. This section is based in part on Imai, Mehranvar, and Sander (2007), section II. 
3. At the time it was called International Nickel Company. It officially changed its name to INCO 
in 1976 (see McFarlane 1989). 
4. Carlos Arana Osorio was elected as president in 1970, in what was referred to by McFarlane as 
a “fraudulent election”. Upon his election, Arana stated that he would, if necessary, “turn the 
country into a cemetery in order to pacify it” (McFarlane 1989, 130). 
5. For example, Oliverio Castañeda de León, a member of the University Student 
Association, was machine-gunned to death in broad daylight in front of hundreds of 
witnesses, including police. The police did not attempt to chase or arrest the shooters 
(Gerardi 1998). 
6. Note that the first evictions in November took place without a court order, which is required 
by Guatemalan law (Paley 2007). 
7. HudBay Minerals has indicated that the Canadian dollar is the company’s functional 
currency. See Audited annual financial statements – English, HudBay Minerals, dated 19 
February 2014. All references to dollar amounts in relation to HudBay Minerals, unless 
otherwise specified, refer to Canadian dollars. 
8. The recent conviction at first instance of Ríos Montt, Guatemala’s former military leader, in 
Guatemalan Courts for genocide and crimes against humanity during the civil war represents 
an important step in Guatemala’s fight against impunity (UN News Center 2013a). However, 
the verdict was annulled by the Constitutional Court a few days later (UN News Center 
2013b). 
9. For photos of Lote 9 see University of Northern British Columbia (2008). 
10. Fontierras or “Fondo de Tierras” is a state entity responsible for keeping a registry of land 
titles. 
11. The courts of first instance, or trial courts, are referred to this way, so that the Ninth Judge of 
the Civil Trial Court refers to a judge at the Civil Trial level. 
12. For a description of litigation in Canada and the Interamerican system, see North and Young 
(2013). 
13. Much of the conflict in and around Junin between farmers, the security forces, and the 
mining community has been filmed by Malcolm Rogge in his documentary film, Under 
Rich Earth (see the website at http://underrichearth.ryecinema.com/?page_id=114). 
14. There is significant support for legislation in Canada that would provide accountability for the 
 activities of extractive industries in other countries, but attempts at a legislative solution have 
not been successful. For a full discussion, see Kamphuis (2012). 
15. Author’s translation. Original: “Appliquer notre droit à des situations à l’extérieur de notre 
territoire est contraire à nos conceptions; mais il y a des actes tellement répugnants qu’ils 
doivent nous forcer à revoir nos conceptions du droit. Au XVIIIe siècle, la piraterie 
posait une telle menace qu’on pouvait juger les pirates sans égard au lieu de leurs crimes”. 
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